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·0: j4: JOINDER & SEVERANCE OF DEFENDANTS I ~ Paul C. Giannelli :i r~ 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
I ::J This article discusses joinder and severance of defen-dants. A subsequent article examines the joinder and sev-
r 
:lerance of offenses. See generally 2 Katz & Giannelli, 
Cb8aldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal Law ch. 58 (1996). 
~ Criminal Rule 8 governs joinder of defendants in one in-
~()lictment, information, or complaint. Rule 13 governs the 
consolidation for trial of defendants when there is more than 
one indictment, information, or complaint. Finally, Rule 14 
governs severance of defendants. The importance of join-
der cannot be overestimated. As one commentator has 
noted: 
The way in which the prosecutor chooses to combine 
offenses or defendants in a single indictment is per-
haps second in importance only to his decision to 
prosecute. Whether a defendant is tried en masse with 
many other participants in an alleged crime, or in a 
separate trial of his own, will often be decisive of the 
outcome. Equally decisive may be the number of of-
fenses which are cumulated against a single defen-
dant, particularly if they are unconnected. 8 Moore's 
Federal Practice 8-3 (Cipes ed. 1993). 
JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS: RULE 8(B) 
Criminal Rule 8(8) provides that defendants may be 
prosecuted under the same indictment, information, or com-
plaint if they are alleged to have participated (1) in the same 
criminal act, transaction, or series of acts or transactions, or 
(2) in the same course of criminal conduct. The Rule further 
specifies that these defendants may be charged in each 
count separately or together and that all of the joined defen-
dants need not be charged in each count. 
Joinder of Offenses 
Rule 8(8) differs from Rule 8(A), which governs joinder of 
offenses, in one important respect. Rule B(A) permits the 
joinder of offenses that "are of the same or similar charac-
ter:· A comparable provision relating to the joinder of defen-
dants does not appear in Rule 8(8); defendants may be 
tried together only if they are alleged to have participated 
(1) in the same acts or transactions or (2) in the same 
course of criminal conduct. Moreover, Rules 8(A) and 8(8) 
operate independently of each other. Thus, if X has commit-
ted one robbery by himself and a second robbery withY, all 
charges cannot be tried at one time because Y did not par-
ticipate in the first robbery. The prosecutor could try X alone 
for both robberies by joining offenses under Rule B(A), in 
which caseY would be tried separately for the second rob-
bery. Alternatively, X andY could be tried jointly under Rule 
8(8) for the second robbery, in which case X would be tried 
alone for the first robbery. 
MULTIPLE INDICTMENTS & COMPLAINTS: RULE 13 
As discussed above, Rule 8(8) prescribes tests for join-
der in a single indictment, information, or complaint. 
Criminal Rule 13 governs joinder where there is more than 
one indictment, information, or complaint. 
Rule 13 is broken into two paragraphs which are almost 
identical in wording. The first paragraph authorizes the 
court to order "two or more indictments or informations or 
both to be tried together:• Paragraph two provides the same 
procedure for combining multiple complaints for misde-
meanors in courts of inferior jurisdiction. In each, consolida-
tion is permissive and authorized only if the defendants 
could have been joined in a single indictment or information 
(paragraph one) or in a single complaint (paragraph two). 
The tests for determining whether joinder of defendants is 
proper are found in Rule 8(8). 
The final provision of both paragraph one and two re-
quires that the procedure be the "same as if the prosecution 
were under a single indictment, information, [or complaint]:' 
"Procedure" is not defined. Presumably, it refers to mechan-
ical aspects of trial such as the number of peremptory chal-
lenges. 
SEVERANCE: RULE 14 
Criminal Rule 14 provides that when two or more defen-
dants have been properly joined in an indictment, informa-
tion, or complaint pursuant to Rule 8(8) and it appears that 
the defendant or the state is prejudiced by the joinder, the 
court may grant severance of defendants or provide appro-
priate relief. 
The decision to grant severance falls within the trial 
"--'thief Public Defender James A. Draper Telephone (216) 443-7223 
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court's discretion. As one court stated, 
It is axiomatic that the granting of separate trials for 
codefendants is a matter for the discretion of the trial 
judge .... Absent some abuse of discretion, to be 
demonstrated by a clear showing of prejudice and the 
consequent denial of a fair trial, the determination is 
not subject to reversal. State v. Perod, 15 Ohio App.2d 
115, 120, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968). 
See also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993) 
("Rule 14 leaves the determination of risk of prejudice and 
any remedy that may be necessary to the sound discretion 
of the district courts."). 
In this context, prejudice may arise in different circum-
stances: (1) where a defendant wants to call a codefendant 
as a witness, (2) where two defendants have antagonistic 
defenses, (3) where the danger of guilt by association is 
present, (4) where the complexity of the case may make it 
difficult for the jury to separate the evidence for each defen-
dant, and (5) where a codefendant's confession implicating 
the defendant is offered at trial. These circumstances are 
discussed below. They are not, however, exhaustive. 
CODEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY 
In some cases a defendant has been prejudiced because 
a joint trial precluded the calling of codefendants who could 
have provided exculpatory evidence. A leading case is 
United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1965), 
in which the defendant was charged with suborning perjury, 
impeding the administration of justice, and conspiracy. 
Echeles's codefendant had previously testified in another 
trial that Echeles was not involved in the events upon which 
the present charges were based. Echeles moved for a sev-
erance so that the codefendant would testify in his behalf. 
The trial court denied the motion;·the Seventh Circuit re-
versed. Under the circumstances of the case, the court 
found that (1) the trial court could have ordered the codefen-
dant tried first, and (2) Echeles "should not be foreclosed of 
the possibility that [the codefendant] would testify in his be-
half" merely because the codefendant might claim his Fifth 
Amendment privilege even if separate trials were ordered. 
The burden is significant in this respect: the defendant 
must specify not only that the codefendant will be called as 
a witness but also the purpose sought by calling the code-
fendant. A mere allegation that the defendant contemplates 
calling a codefendant is insufficient. See State v. Perod, 15 
Ohio App.2d 115, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968) (any prejudice re-
sulting from a joint trial is merely speculative). Thus, coun-
sel should disclose the exculpatory effect of the codefen-
dant's anticipated testimony as well as the basis for believ-
ing why the codefendant would testify if severance is grant-
ed. Where an appellant in his motion for severance states, 
however, that each defendant might decide to call the other 
as a witness, but does not, such a ground is purely hypo-
thetical and fails to establish actual prejudice. State v. 
Warren, No. 86AP-127 (1Oth Dist. Ct. App., 1 0-9-86). 
ANTAGONISTIC DEFENSES 
Severance may be sought where there are conflicting de-
fenses and strategies. See 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal 
Procedure§ 17.3 (1985). "[l]t has long been the view that 
defendants joined for trial should be granted a severance 
whenever their defenses are antagonistic to each other." 
ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance 41 
( 1968). One court of appeals has defined an antagonistic 
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defense as one in which a defendant seeks to exculpate 
himself by blaming his codefendant. State v. Daniels, 92 
Ohio App.3d 473, 636 N.E.2d 336 (1993). Conflicting de-
fenses, however, do not necessarily mandate severance. 
The problem presented by antagonistic defenses is illus- ~V 
trated by Deluna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 143 (5th ' 1 .t 
Cir. 1962), in which two defendants were tried jointly for nar-
cotics offenses. One of the defendants, Gomez, moved for 
severance prior to trial, but the motion was denied. 
Although the second defendant, Deluna, did not testify at 
trial, Gomez took the stand and blamed Deluna for the of-
fense. In closing argument, Gomez's counsel commented 
that "at least one man was honest enough and had courage 
enough to take the stand and subject himself to cross-ex-
amination .... You haven't heard a word from [Deluna]." 
This tactic apparently worked - Gomez was acquitted and 
Deluna convicted. On appeal, the Fifth Circuif reversed. 
The court believed that Gomez's attorney had acted proper-
ly; "his attorney should be free to draw all rational inferences 
from the failure of a codefendant to testify, just as an attor-
ney is free to comment on the effect of any interested 
party's failure to produce material evidence in his posses-
sion or to call witnesses who have knowledge of pertinent 
facts." Nevertheless, from Deluna's perspective, the com-
ments prejudiced the exercise of his Fifth Amendment right 
to remain silent. This conflict could have been avoided; the 
court noted, "for each of the defendants to see the face of 
Justice they must be tried separately:• Deluna v. United 
States, 308 F.2d 140, 155 (5th Cir. 1962). 
Other examples of antagonistic defenses include: People 
v. Hurst, 396 Mich. 1, 9, 238 N.W.2d 6, 10 (1976) Ooint trial i 
improper because one defendant "would testify to exculpate " .···. i 
herself and incriminate [the other]"); Murray v. State, 528 ~J))~ / ( 
P.2d 739, 740 (Okla. Crim. 1974) ("Denial of a severance in · 
the instant case resulted in pitting defendant against co-de- I 
fendant:'); People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839, . 
842 (1936) ("Any set of circumstances which is sufficient to 
deprive a defendant of a fair trial if tried jointly with another 
is sufficient to require a separate trial."). 
In State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 124 n. 22, 47 
N.E.2d 482 (1969), the court of appeals observed: "[l]t is 
easy to imagine further complications in a consolidated trial. 
For example, suppose one defendant takes the stand and 
the other does not. Is the failure to testify subject to com-
ment by the lawyer for the testifying codefendant?" 
Although the court did not have to answer this question to 
decide that case, it did give some inkling as to how it would 
have decided the issue when it stated: ''This court unani-
mously disapproves the consolidation as not consonant with 
good practice in criminal trials:· ld. at 123. 
In Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 543 (1993), the United 
States Supreme Court held that a severance was not re-
quired merely because antagonistic defenses are raised. 
Charged with distributing drugs, Zafiro claimed that she was 
merely the girlfriend of Martinez, another defendant, and 
knew nothing of the drugs. Martinez argued that he was 
merely visiting his girlfriend, Zafiro, and had no idea that 
she was involved in distributing drugs. The Court wrote: 
''There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of 
d_efendan_ts who ~re. indi_cte? together. Joint trials 'play a . ~\ ;) ' L 
v1tal role 1n the cnmmal JUStice system.' They promote eff1- ~-
ciency and 'serve the interests of justice by avoiding the 
scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts."' ld. at 539 (cit-
ing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987)). The 
Court went on to hold: 
r 
Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per 
s.e. Moreover, Rule 14 does not require severance 
even if prejudice is shown; rather it leaves the tailoring 
of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's 
sound discretion .... 
[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under 
Rule 8(b), a district court should grant a severance 
under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint 
trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of 
the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reli-
able judgment about guilt or innocence. Such a risk 
might occur when evidence that the jury should not 
consider against a defendant and that would not be ad-
missible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted 
against a codefendant. !d. at 538-39. 
As examples, the Court cited cases where a codefendant's 
wrongdoing could lead a jury to convict the defendant, a 
complex case with markedly different degrees of culpability, 
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), or where a 
codefendant's confession implicated the defendant. Bruton 
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968). 
In sum, severance is required only if a trial right is in-
volved or there is a risk of an unreliable verdict. In addition, 
"less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often 
will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice" and "defendants are 
not entitled to severance merely because they may have a 
better chance of acquittal in separate trials:· Zafiro v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). 
Furthermore, mere hostility between defendants is not 
enough to necessitate separate trials. In deciding whether 
· oo grant a severance, the trial judge must balance the possi-
>- ble prejudice to the defendant against the government's in-
terest in judicial economy and must consider ways in which 
the prejudice can be lessened by other means. See State v. 
Brooks, No. 9190 (2d Dist. Ct. App., 6-4-87). Nor is the sim-
ple assertion of different defenses enough to necessitate 
separate trials. A murder defendant who intends to raise an 
alibi defense which would make his case different from his 
codefendant's does not establish prejudice resulting from a 
denial of severance where the defendant does not assert 
the alibi defense at trial. State v. Robles, 65 Ohio App.3d 
104, 583 N.E.2d 318 (1989). 
GUILT BY ASSOCIATION 
In some cases the accumulation of evidence against one 
defendant may spill over on other defendants, resulting in a 
conviction of the latter even though the evidence against 
that defendant is weak or marginal - in short, guilt by asso-
ciation. "By a joint trial of such separate offenses, a subtle 
bond is likely to be created between the several defendants 
though they have never met nor acted in unison; prejudice 
within the meaning of Rule 14 is implicit." Shaffer v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 511, 532 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
The issue is whether the evidence as to each defendant is 
direct and uncomplicated and the jury is capable of segre-
gating the proof as to each defendant. State v. Parker, 72 
Ohio App.3d 456,594 N.E.2d 1033 (1991). 
l In United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 756 (2d Cir. 1965) 
'(citing Fed. R. 14), cert. denied, 384 US. 947 (1966), the 
Second Circuit reversed a conviction on this ground, comment-
ing that severance should have been granted "the moment it 
appeared that [the defendant] was likely to be prejudiced by the 
accumulation of evidence of wrongdoing by his codefendant." 
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Similarly, in United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 977 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), one of the Watergate defendants was tried 
along with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell. His alleged 
participation in the Watergate coverup was minor compared 
to that of the more well-known codefendants. On appeal, 
the D.C. Circuit reversed because Mardian's motion to sever 
was not granted. The court commented: "Particularly where 
there is a great disparity in the weight of the evidence, 
strongly establishing the guilt of some defendants, the dan-
ger persists that guilt will improperly 'rub off' on the others." 
In contrast, where an appellant argued in support of his 
motion for severance that his codefendant's criminal record 
would probably be introduced during the trial and would 
prejudice the jury against him, such an argument does not 
affirmatively show that appellant will be prejudiced by the 
joint tria!. State v. Dozanti, No. 1640 (11th Dist. Ct. App., 11-
21-86). 
COMPLEXITY 
Where the number of charges and defendants is so nu-
merous that the jury will be incapable of distinguishing the 
evidence and applying the law to each defendant separate-
ly, a severance should be granted. "When many defendants 
are tried together in a complex case and they have marked-
ly different degrees of culpability, this risk of prejudice is 
heightened." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 
(1993) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,774-
75 (1946)). 
United States v. Moreton, 25 F.R.D. 262, 263 (W.D.N.Y. 
1960), illustrates this problem. The trial court granted a sev-
erance, stating: 
The complex involvement of the various defendants 
and the multiplicity of charges contained in the indict-
ment would render it difficult, if not impossible, for the 
court to adequately charge a jury as to the applicable 
law with respect to each defendant and for the jury to 
apply that law intelligently in reaching verdicts on the 
many charges involved. 
City of Cincinnati v. Reichman, 27 Ohio App.2d 125, 272 
N.E.2d 904 (1974), also illustrates this point. The defendant 
was charged along with three others for disorderly conduct 
but was not charged, as were the other codefendants, with 
aiding and abetting. All charges arose out of a civil protest. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a separate 
trial, which the appellate court concluded was an abuse of 
discretion. The transcript of testimony was 1 ,291 pages; 
photographs were received in evidence depicting scenes of 
many individuals and groups of individuals which had no re-
lationship to the defendant's charge of disorderly conduct. 
The appellate court determined that the jury would have 
great difficulty in determining which portion of the evidence 
applied to the individual charge against the defendant. 
See also State v. Parker, 72 Ohio App.3d 456, 594 
N.E.2d 1033 (1991) (where evidence relevant to each of 
three co-defendants is direct and uncomplicated, so that the 
jury is capable of segregating the proof as to each defen-
dant, the trial court's failure to sever defendant's trial was 
not error; moreover, defendant's testimony that he was left 
uncertain as to whether he should testify at a joint trial failed 
to establish that non-severance prejudiced his rights be-
cause all defendant has asserted is that better trial tactics 
existed if the trial was severed), dismissed, jurisdictional 








CODEFENDANT'S CONFESSION (BRUTON RULE) 
In Bruton v. United States; 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the pros-
ecution in a joint trial sought to introduce the confession of 
one defendant, which inculpated Bruton, another defendant. 
The government contended that a limiting instruction direct-
ing the jury not to use the confession against Bruton provid-
ed sufficient protection. The United States Supreme Court, 
however, found the limiting instruction inadequate. 
According to the Court, 
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and 
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, 
that the practical and human limitations of the jury sys-
tem cannot be ignored .... Such a context is present-
ed here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudi-
cial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused 
side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately 
spread before the jury in a joint trial. ld. at 135-36 
Since the Court found the instruction ineffective and the ac-
complice did not take the stand, the Court ruled that Bruton 
had been denied the Sixth Amendment right of confronta-
tion because the right to cross-examine the codefendant 
about the statement had been foreclosed. In Roberts v. 
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), the Bruton principle was 
made applicable to the states. See also State v. Moritz, 63 
Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980). 
The Ohio courts had addressed this issue prior to Bruton. 
The court of appeals recognized as long ago as 1942 that 
the general rule is "that where one of several defendants 
jointly indicted has made admissions or confessions impli-
cating others, a severance should be ordered unless the at-
torney for the state declares that such admissions or con-
fessions will not be offered in evidence on the trial:' State v. 
?hater, 71 Ohio App. 1, 7, 47 N.E.2d 669 (1942). Similarly, 
m State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 342, 86 N.E.2d 24 
(1949), the Ohio Supreme Court referred to the "prejudicial 
effect" of such a confession on the defendant as constituting 
good cause under the severance statute. After noting that 
limiting instructions are often ineffective in these situations 
the Court found that the "prejudicial matter should be strick-
en out or deleted before the confession is admitted in evi-
dence:• 
The Ohio rule stated in Rosen is broader than the consti-
t~tional principle of Bruton, because the necessary preju-
dice does not depend on a failure of confrontation. If an 
Ohio judge knows that the state intends to use the confes-
sion of a codefendant which contains matter prejudicial to 
the other defendant in a joint trial, it is an abuse of discretion 
not to grant a severance. The emphasis in Rosen is on the 
effect of the confession on the jury. "[l]n many cases the ad-
mission of such ex parte statements creates impressions so 
adverse that they may not be eradicated from the minds of 
the members of the jury:• State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 
342, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949). 
limitations 
Bruton does not apply to bench trials where there is no 
jury to be misled. See State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d 
112, 381 N.E.2d 960 (1978). Moreover, the codefendant's 
confession in Bruton was clearly inadmissible under the 
hearsay rule as to Bruton. See Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 128 n.3 (1976). If a codefendant's confession falls 
within a recognized hearsay exception, such as the cocon-
spirators exemption, Evid. R. 801 (D)(2)(e), there is no con-
frontation violation. The United States Supreme Court later 
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ruled that coconspirator statements automatically satisfy the 
reliability requirement imposed by the Confrontation Clause 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), and that the' 
unavailability of the declarant need not be established as a 
condition for admitting coconspirator statements. United -..c:-,, 1 
States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). ~,)I' 
Exclusion 
In addition to severance, there are several ways to avoid 
the Bruton problem. Excluding the evidence is a possibility, 
but a rather unattractive one from the prosecution's per-
spective. 
Redaction 
The Bruton problem may be avoided if the prosecution 
can delete (redact) all references in the confession that re-
late to the codefendant. See Bruton v. United States 391 
U.S. 123, 134 n. 10 (1976); State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio' st. 
339, 342, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949). See also United States v. 
Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[A] redacted 
statement in which the names of co-defendants are re-
placed by neutral pronouns, with no indication to the jury 
that the original statement contained actual names, and 
where the statement standing alone does not otherwise 
connect co-defendants to the crimes, may be admitted with-
out violating a co-defendant's Bruton rights:'), cert. denied, 
493 u.s. 1081 (1990). 
Redaction, however, is not always effective. "There are, of 
course, instances in which such editing is not possible; the 
references to the codefendant may be so frequent or so 
closely interrelated with references to the maker's conduct 
that little would be left of the statement after editing." ABA 
Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance 38 (1967). ___ 1 
Indeed, su~h editing of ~he confession may only serve to ''ilJJi I 
draw attent1on to the obJect of the censorship. See Hodges 1 
v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. 
nom., Lewis v. Rose, 436 U.S. 909 (1978). 
The United States Supreme Court sanctioned the redac-
tion procedure in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). 
Marsh was present during a robbery and murder. A witness 
testified about her conduct during the crime, indicating that 
Marsh, along with two others, was an active participant. 
The confession of her codefendant, Williams was then ad-
mitted in evidence. This confession was red~cted to omit all 
reference to Marsh. Indeed, it omitted all reference to any-
one o~her than Williams and Martin, the third alleged ac-
complice, who was a fugitive at the time of the trial. Marsh 
testified in her own defense. She admitted being present at 
the scene but denied any prior knowledge that the crime 
would occur. Her testimony, however, placed her in a car 
with Williams and Martin just prior to the crime and 
Williams's confession indicated that the crime .:Vas dis-
cu_s~ed ~t that tim~. The trial court instructed the jury that 
Williams s confession could be considered only when deter-
mining Williams's guilt. 
The Supreme Court commented: "We hold that the 
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 
~ontest!fying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting 
mstruct1on when, as here, the confession is redacted to 
eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference 
to her e~istence:' ld. a_t 21 ~. In Bruton the codefendant's ~ ;)) ; 
confession expressly Implicated Bruton as the accomplice. ,_ 
In contrast, the codefendant's confession on its face did not 
implicate Marsh. Marsh was linked to the confession only 
through other evidence admitted at trial, i.e., her own testi-
mony. The Court held that "evidentiary linkage" or "contextu-
rr 
( 
al implication" does not present the potential for jury disre-
gard of the limiting instruction that underlies the Bruton de-
cision: 
In short, while it may not always be simple for the 
members of a jury to obey the instruction that they dis-
regard an incriminating inference, there does not exist 
the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so 
that is the foundation of Bruton's exception to the gen-
eral rule. ld. at 208. 
In addition, the Court cited the practical difficulties of adopt-
ing a different rule. A redacted confession can be reviewed 
prior to trial, but assessing "evidentiary linkage" prior to trial 
is often impossible. 
The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio 
St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980), held that Bruton should 
be applied to a!! statements that tend to incriminate a code-
fendant, whether or not that defendant is actually named in 
the statement. The United States Supreme Court in 
Richardson, however, declined to go as far as Moritz and 
declined to apply Bruton to a statement that was not incrimi-
nating on its face but was so only when linked with other 
trial testimony. In State v. Laird, 65 Ohio App.3d 113, 583 
N.E.2d 323 (1989), a court of appeals followed Richardson 
and not Moritz. 
Codefendant Testimony 
The Bruton problem is avoided, at least in some in-
stances, if the codefendant testifies at trial. Under these cir-
cumstances, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the codefendant on the accuracy of the out-of-court 
statement, thereby obviating the confrontation issue. The 
United States Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v. 
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629-30 (1971 ): "We conclude that 
where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, 
denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating 
the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the de-
fendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has 
been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments." See also State v. Doherty, 56 
Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E.2d 960 (1978). 
The Nelson rationale is inapplicable where both defen-
dants are represented by the same attorney because in 
such a case cross-examination of the testifying codefendant 
would present a conflict of interests. See Courtney v. United 
States, 486 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1973); Holland v. Henderson, 
460 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Interlocking Confessions 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of interlock-
ing confessions in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 
(1979). Unlike Bruton, Parker had also confessed. The plu-
rality opinion in Parker distinguished Bruton: ''The right pro-
tected in Bruton -the 'constitutional right of cross-exami-
nation, ... has far less practical value to a defendant who 
has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistent-
ly maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a 
codefendant's confession on cross-examination would likely 
yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admis-
sion of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged:' Conse-
quently, the plurality found the Bruton rule inapplicable. 
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected the interlocking 
confession doctrine, as espoused in Parker, finding the in-
troduction of a nontestifying codefendant's confession viola-
tive of the Confrontation Clause. In Cruz v. New York, 481 
U.S. 186 (1987), Eulogio Cruz was tried along with his 
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brother, Benjamin, for the death of a gas station attendant. 
Benjamin's confession, which implicated Eulogio, was ad-
mitted at trial. 
The Court held: 
Where a nontestifying codefendant's confession facial-
ly incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible 
against defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its 
admission at the joint trial, even if the jury is instructed 
not to consider it against defendant, and even if the de-
fendant's own confession is admitted against him. 
This case is indistinguishable from Bruton with respect 
to those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this 
area: the likelihood that the instruction will be disre-
garded, ... the probability that such disregard will 
have a devastating effect, ... and the determinability 
of these facts in advance of trial .... 
Rebuttal 
In Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), which in-
volved a burglary-murder allegedly perpetrated by the de-
fendant and an accomplice, the Court ruled that Bruton was 
not violated by the prosecution's use of an accomplice's 
statement in rebuttal. One defendant claimed that he was 
forced to sign a confession that mirrored that of his codefen-
dant. The prosecution was allowed to admit the codefen-
dant's confession for the nonhearsay purpose of illustrating 
the dissimilarities between the two confessions and thus to 
discredit the defendant's claim. Chief Justice Burger con-
cluded that the limiting instruction adequately protected the 
defendant's legitimate interest in ensuring that the confes-
sion was not misused by the jury, and "unlike the situation in 
Bruton, ... there were no alternatives that would have both 
assured the integrity of the trial's truth-seeking function and 
eliminated the risk of the jury's improper use of evidence:' 
ld. at 415. 
Since the sheriff who took both statements was available 
at trial for questioning, the Court ruled that a Bruton issue 
was not involved. "In short, the State's rebuttal witness 
against the [the defendant] was not [his accomplice], but 
[the sheriff]:' ld. at 414. 
Harmless Error 
Bruton issues are subject to the harmless error doctrine. 
See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (the other 
evidence against the accused was so overwhelming that the 
denial of the constitutional right in that instance was harm-
less); State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 
(1980); State v. Utsler, 21 Ohio App.2d 167,255 N.E.2d 861 
(1970); State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 123 n. 1, 247 
N.E.2d 482 (1969). 
CAPITAL CASES 
Where two or more persons are jointly indicted for a capi-
tal offense, Criminal Rule 14 provides that severance is au-
tomatic. In effect, this provision presumes prejudice in joint 
trials of capital offenses. Joinder of defendants requires a 
motion by the prosecution or one of the defendants and ap-
proval by the court for good cause shown. The burden of 
establishing good cause rests on the prosecutor. See State 
v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44,446 N.E.2d 436 (1983); State 
Abbott, 152 Ohio St. 228,89 N.E.2d 147 (1949); State v. 
Fields, 29 Ohio App.2d 154,279 N.E.2d 616 (1971). This 
provision follows R.C. Section 2945.20 and thus, cases in-
terpreting that provision are still persuasive authority. 
Good cause for joinder in capital cases must meet a 
higher standard than that usually applied in support of joint 
trials. As theOhioSupreme.Courtnotedin Statev. Abbott, 
152 Ohio St. 228, 236, 89 N.E.2d 147 (1949): 
[G]ood cause must necessarily be some operative fac-
tor not present in every case of joint indictments of de-
fendants in capital cases. For instance, the additional 
time and labor required of the state or court, or the ex-
pense to the state, made necessary by separate trials, 
cannot be assigned or considered as good cause. 
See also State v. Dingledine, 28 Ohio Abs. 685, 687-88, 33 
N.E.2d 660, 662-63 (App. 1939) (crowded dockets insuffi-
cient to establish good cause; saving time and money insuf-
ficient; separate trials would cause delay which might de-
prive a defendant of a speedy trial are insufficient), appeal 
dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 251, 20 N.E.2d 6367 (1939). 
Administrative and economic reasons for a joint trial were 
also rejected in State v. Richardson, 39 Ohio Abs. 608, 613, 
54 N.E.2d 160 {App. 1943). The court went on to hold, how-
ever, that joinder was proper under the circumstances of 
that case because it "enable[ d) the jury to have a clearer in-
sight into the testimony and enable[ d) it to arrive more intelli-
gently at a proper conclusion." See also State v. Jenkins, 76 
Ohio App. 277, 64 N.E.2d 86 (1944) Goint trial permitted 
where it appears that all the defendants had planned and 
executed the crime and that each had so confessed. The 
defendants are not thereby deprived of a fair trial where the 
court carefully instructs the jury concerning the application 
of the confessions), appeal dismissed, 144 Ohio St. 638, 60 
N.E.2d 182 (1945). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the joint trial of 
codefendants in an aggravated murder case may be or-
dered provided the mandates of Rule 14 and R.C. 2945.20 
are strictly observed. State v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44, 446 
N.E.2d 436 (1983). See also State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio 
St.2d 106, 285 N.E.2d 751 (1972) (Absent any necessity 
demonstrated in the record for a defendant's trial to run seri-
atim with the trials of codefendants, a defendant is not de-
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nied due process where the state, in order to insure a trial 
free from prejudice, conducts separate murder trials simul-
taneously in different courtrooms.). 
Failure to object to joinder in capital cases may constitute 
a waiver. See State v. Williams, 85 Ohio App: 236, 88 
N.E.2d 20 (1947); State v. Bohannon, 64 Ohio App. 431, 28 
N.E.2d 1010 (1940). 
MOTION TO SEVER 
A motion for relief from prejudicial joinder pursuant to 
Criminal Rule 14 is considered a pretrial motion under Rule 
12{B)(5). Therefore, the motion must be raised before trial 
or the issue is deemed waived unless the defendant can 
show good cause for the court to grant relief from the waiv-
er. Furthermore, a request by the defendants for separate 
trials is a prerequisite to appeal the issue of failure to order 
separate trials. State v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44, 446 N.E.2d 
436 (1983). 
In determining whether the confession of one codefen-
dant implicates another, Rule 14 authorizes the court to 
order the prosecutor to deliver to the court any statements 
made by any of the defendants which are to be introduced 
at trial. The basis for such an inspection is Criminal Rule 
16{B){1 )(a) which gives the defendant the right to inspect 
any relevant statements made by the defendant or his code-
fendants that are in the possession of the state. This rule of 
discovery provides a great advantage to the defendant de-
siring severance. Without access to a codefendant's confes-
sion, provided for in Rule 16(B)(1 )(a), the showing of preju-
dice necessary for severance under Rule 14 might be ex-
ceedingly difficult. 
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